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Recent Japanese Policy in China
HE significance of Japan's new China
T policy,
which was outlined by Baron
Tanaka last July, several months after he
succeeded Premier Wakatsuki as head of the
Japanese Government, was not generally
appreciated in the United States until a
short time ago when China voiced a strong
protest against certain Japanese demands
with respect to Manchuria. The anti-Japanese agitation which followed served to emphasize the apparent departure of the
Tanaka government from the "Friendship
Policy" pursued by its predecessors since
the Washington Conference, at least so far
as Manchuria and Mongolia are concerned.
The new "Positive Policy" draws a sharp
line between Manchuria and Mongolia and
China proper; it reasserts Japan's special
interests in the former area, and openly
announces Japan's intention to defend these
interests at all costs.
The importance of Tanaka's policy may be
gauged by a comparison with previous policies and a survey of the nature and extent of
Japan's interests in Manchuria.
In the period between 1895 and 1922,

that is, from about the time of the SinoJapanese War until after the Washington
Conference, Japanese policy seemed to be
directed primarily toward securing a position of influence in China. This policy, which
at times was conducted with little or no regard for the susceptibilities of the Chinese,
was justified by Japanese on the ground of
checking Russia's advances, which threatened the peace of the Far East. The Treaty
of Shimonoseki, terminating the war with
China in 1895, gave to Japan the island of
Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the right to hold Weihaiwei until China had carried out the
provisions of the treaty. Although immediately forced by the European powers to surrender the Liaotung Peninsula Japan regained control of Port Arthur and Dairen
as a result of her successful war against
Russia in 1905. In 1910 Japan annexed
Korea. In 1915 she took advantage of
European preoccupation with the World
War to serve upon China the famous
Twenty-One Demands which culminated in
the treaties and agreements of May, 1915.
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Thus, following the example of the western powers in building powerful armies and
navies and in protecting and extending national interests, if need be by force, Japan
secured a dominant position of influence on
the Asiatic mainland. At the time of the
Washington Conference Japan had succeeded
to the Russian rights in Manchuria and the
German rights in Shantung, and, because of
her close proximity to China, was probably
in a stronger position than either Germany
or Russia had been. J apancse troops also
occupied the port of Vladivostok, and the
northern part of Sakhalin.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED
AT WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Despite vigorous criticism from a number
of influential Japanese newspapers, the Japanese Government accepted President Harding's invitation to the Washington Conference in 1921. At the Conference Japan subscribed to the naval treaty and the several
agreements relating to China. Article 1
of the treaty relating to principles and
policies to be followed in matters concerning
China laid down certain specific obligations
which the signatory powers, including Japan,
agreed to observe. It read as follows:
ARTICLE I. The Contracting
than China, agree:

Powers, other

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and
maintain for herself an effective and stable
government;
(3) To use their influence for the purpose
of effectually establishing and maintaining the
principle of equal opportunity for the commerce
and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights
or privileges which would abridge the rights of
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from
countenancing action inimical to the security of
such States.

In carrying out these and other obligations, Japan introduced a new policy toward
China, popularly known as the "Friendship
Policy."

EARLY RESULTS OF
"FRIENDSHIP POLICY"

The effects of the "Friendship Policy" t
ward China began to appear shortly after th
Washington Conference. Within a year th
Japanese Government withdrew its troop
from Hankow and Shantung, although sti
retaining them in Manchuria, and also with
drew its post offices in all parts of China ex
cept Manchuria. In the Washington treaty o
February 4, 1922, Japan agreed to terminat
the lease of Tsingtao, which Germany ha
secured for ninety-nine years in 1898, and t
hand over to China the Shantung railwa
constructed by Germany. Ratification of th
treaty by the two governments was affected
in June, 1922. China was given fifteen years
to pay for this road, the value of which was
fixed by a joint commission at 40,000,000
yen.* This settlement, according to Mr. John
E. Baker, adviser to the Chinese Ministry
of Communications, secures better terms for
China than are to be found in any other
railway contract negotiated under the Republic.
In April, 1923, the Japanese and American
Governments in an exchange of notes terminated the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 2, 1917, in which the United States
had recognized Japan's "special interests in
China, particularly in the part to which her
possessions are contiguous." By 1924, Japan
had settled most of her difficulties with Russia and had agreed to withdraw her troops
from northern Sakhalin, in return for certain concessions. Following the example of
the United States, the Japanese Government
in March, 1923 turned over Japan's share
of the Boxer indemnity, and also the payments which China must make on the Shantung properties, to a special fund for Chinese
educational and cultural work.
The effort of the Japanese to regain
China's good will was further demonstrated
during the famous "May 30 Affair" of 1925,
when foreign police opened fire on Chinese
demonstrators in Shanghai who were protesting the shooting of a Chinese laborer by
Japanese cotton mill guards·. The affair led
quickly to a general strike and serious antiforeign demonstrations throughout China.
• A yen Is worth ar>Proxima tely 50 rents (Anlerlca.n).
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Japan promptly took steps to appease the
Chinese and quietly paid an indemnity to the
family of the Chinese laborer who had been
killed. As a result of this policy of settling
the affair "out of court," the Japanese escaped the worst effects of the outburst of
Chinese opinion which was subsequently
directed against other foreigners.
JAPAN AVOIDS INTERVENTION
IN CHINA'S REVOLUTION

Despite the fact that out of the 346,000
foreigners in China approximately 235,000
are Japanese and that Japanese trade in 1926
predominated in China, the Japanese Government has until recently followed a policy
of "non-intervention" toward the Chinese
revolution. During the Nanking incident
of 1927, in which Japanese as well as other
foreign property was destroyed, the Tokyo
Government consistently opposed the idea of
intervention. In this it was apparently supported by a majority of the Japanese press.
When a similar incident occurred at Nanking in 1913 it led to a riot in Tokyo and
a strong demand for action. Commenting on
this change, a well-known Japanese writer,
Yusuke Tsurumi, states, "But when the
trouble occurred in Nanking this year there
was no ripple on the surface of Tokyo's
political waters and no public protest over
non-intervention. How account for this
change? It was because in the first place the
psychology of the people had changed. In
the second place, there was a strong sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of the
Chinese people embodied in the Nationalist
movement. And in the third place the sending of troops into a foreign country was disliked by the people after the experience of
the Siberian Expedition."
The official attitude of the Japanese Government toward the situation in China was
defined by Baron Shidehara, the Japanese
Foreign Minister, in an address to the Diet
in January, 1927, in the course of which he
said:
"Japan's policy covering all questions
of relations between Japan and China may
be summarized:
"First-Respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of China and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.

"Second-Promote the solidarity and
economic rapp1·ochement between the two
nations.
"Third-Entertain sympathetically and
helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people and cooperate in efforts of
realization of such aspirations.
"Fourth-Maintain an attitude of patience and cooperation in the present situation in China and at the same time protect
Japan's legitimate and essential rights and
interests by all reasonable means at the
disposal of the Government."
Baron Shidehara's policy apparently made
no distinction between Manchuria and the
rest of China; and while professing the policy of strict non-intervention in Chinese
affairs, it reserved the right of protecting
Japanese lives and property when immediately endangered. At the time this policy
was announced, however, the civil war in
China was confined largely to the South,
where Japanese interests were less important than in the North.
BARON TANAKA CRITIC
OF "FRIENDSHIP POLICY"

The "Friendship Policy" of the Wakatsuki
cabinet was severely criticized in April, 1927
by Baron Tanaka, then the leader of the
opposition party, the Seiyukai.
Baron
Tanaka, a member of the Choshu Clan, was
formerly a general in the Japanese Army,
a Vice-Chief of the General Staff and Minister of War in three recent Cabinets. He
became head of the Seiyukai party in 1925.
In the course of his address he said:
"Disturbances in China have gone from bad to
worse and the conditions there threaten to penetrate into the zone where Japan has vested interests . . . The national flag of Japan has been
trampled upon, and Japanese residents have met
the utmost humiliation. I do not understand the
indifferent attitude the authorities take toward
this.
"In the face of this fact the authorities continue to advocate policies of non-intervention ...
The disturbances in China have gone beyond the
limit of mere domestic disputes, they endanger
the Far East, and threaten to affect the peace
of the world ... Japan should take the initiative,
if necessary, in taking an effective step in cooperation with the Powers. We believe this will
be inevitable."*
•Japan Atlt•ertlser, April 17,

19~7.
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NEW TAN AKA GOVERNMENT
OUTLINES POLICY TOWARD CHINA

A few days later the Wakatsuki cabinet
went out of office and Baron Tanaka was
asked to form a new Government. In announcing the formation of a cabinet, in which
he served in the double capacity of Premier
and Foreign Minister, he declared;
"We have long entertained profound sympathy
with the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese
people and are determined to help them to attain
their end, taking into consideration the situation
at home and abroad. But I consider that such
aspirations could be attained in due order and by
appropriate means ... Moreover, I think that if the
legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people are
fulfilled, they will have no wish to endanger the
present relations between China and the Powers.
... In the matter of Communist activity in China,
Japan can hardly remain indifferent... This activity is a matter of extreme importance from the
viewpoint of the peace of the world and the
happiness of mankind in general, and Japan is
ready to cooperate with the Powers, after taking
into consideration the character of the particular
problems involved, the appropriate time, and the
proposed measures to be taken. . ."*

This announcement called forth the warnings of the Tokyo Asahi, the Osaka Asahi,
the Jiji Shimpo, the Tokyo Nichinichi, and
the Osaka Mainichi, all of whom warned the
government against a positive policy toward
China. The Tokyo Asahi declared:
"No one can foretell the future of China; nevertheless it is advisable to let the Chinese themselves settle their own internal affairs. • . As
every word and action of Premier Tanaka is being
closely watched by the Chinese, we hope the
present administration will be extremely cautious
in executing its policy toward China."

The Jiji Shimpo said:
"We sincerely hope that the new administration will not adopt any radical change in its
policy toward China, neither resort to any rigid
policy, as that is not the real purpose of the
administration, we are sure."

Before the end of the month the new Tanaka government was confronted with an
issue which called for prompt decision. During the spring the Chinese Nationalist army,
under General Chiang Kai-shek, had been
moving northward from Nanking, and in
May it entered Shantung, where Japanese
interests are far more extensive than in the
South. Tokyo acted without delay and dispatched a force of about 2,000 men to Tsingtao, later sending 2,000 more inland to
•Ja11an. Advertiser.. April 22, 1927.

Tsinan and points in between. Simultaneously the Tanaka government denied any
intention to interfere with the military operations of the northern or southern troops
and declared the measure was taken only for
the protection of Japanese nationals in the
area of hostilities. The statement concluded:
"The Japanese Government, therefore, declare that although they dispatched troops
as an unavoidable measure of self-defence,
they have no intention whatever of keeping
them for a prolonged period and the troops
will be wholly withdrawn immediately the
fear of danger to her residents in that region
ceases to exist."
Both the Peking Government and the
Nationalists vigorously protested to Japan
and demanded the immediate evacuation of
the troops. The official news agency of the
Nanking Moderate Nationalists, moreover,
stated that the Japanese troops interfered
with the advance of the southern forces
through occupation of the entire railway
zone from Tsingtao to Tsinan. The occupation quickly led to a southern boycott on
Japanese goods.
JAPANESE PRESS CRITICAL OF
1927 SHANTUNG EXPEDITION

Criticism was also voiced in Japan and a
number of newspapers attacked the policy
of the Tanaka govenment. The Tokyo
Nichinichi, for example, declared that there
was no "need to protect our residents in
Tsinan. On the other hand, there is no doubt
that we have lost much by the misunderstanding we have aroused." The Jiji stated
that "if the unsettled conditions of Tsinan
continue the Government should withdraw
both residents and troops."
Whether or not as a result of the Japanese
occupation, the Nationalist advance through
Shantung soon collapsed. On August 30,
1927, the Japanese Government ordered the
withdrawal of the inland forces on the
ground that the failure of the Nationalist
campaign had removed the risk of disorder
in Shantung. But in a statement issued at
the time of withdrawal, the Japanese Government issued a warning that "in case peace
and order are disturbed in future, not only
in Shantung, but in any part of China where
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Japanese reside, and it is feared that their
safety may be affected, the Japanese Government may be constrained to take such selfdefensive steps as circumstances require."
TAN AKA PROPOSES SEPARATE
POLICY FOR MANCHURIA

Meanwhile Baron Tanaka called an
Oriental Conference, which met in Tokyo in
June, 1927, and was attended by the leading officials in the War and Navy Ministries, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Kwantung Army, the Governor of Kwantung, the Minister to Peking, and the Consuls-general at Mukden and Shanghai. It
was at the final session of this conference
that Baron Tanaka announced that Japanese policy must differ in respect to China
proper and to Manchuria and Mongolia.
While the references to China proper did
not differ materially from previous statements, Baron Tanaka emphasized the fact
that Japan held a special position in Manchuria and Mongolia, "in connection with
her national defense, as well as for the existence of the nation." It is henceforth to
be Japan's own responsibility "to keep the
region fit for safe living of Chinese and foreigners by maintaining peace and order
and developing economic conditions therein." As to the protection of Japan's special
position in this area, the Government

"would carry out measures suitable to the
occasion." Should disturbances arise endangering Japan's special interests, "Japan
will take steps to protect them, no matter
from what direction the menace comes."*
At the Gubernatorial Conference, on
June 27, Tanaka declared that Japan was
"resolved to carry out, either independently or in concert with other powers, a policy
which it deems necessary for the maintenance of peace in the Far East." Some
Japanese papers interpreted these various
statements to mean that the new government had jettisoned Baron Shidehara's
"friendship" policy in favor of the "positive" policy, the exact nature of which was
not known, but which would take a more
stern attitude toward China.
The new government of Japan, it would
appear, will not intervene in China's domestic quarrels outside of Manchuria and
Mongolia unless these quarrels threaten
to injure Japanese interests. But as the
intervention in Shantung shows, the Tanaka government will be much more ready
to intervene to protect these interests than
was the Shidehara government.
The Tanaka government, however, will
apparently not tolerate any disturbance
arising out of civil war in Manchuria because of Japan's "special interests" in this
part of China.
The nature of these interests will now be discussed.

JAPANESE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA
Manchuria, comprising the Three Eastern
Provinces of China, has an area of 365,000
square miles, which is nearly as large as the
states of Washington, Oregon, California
and Utah combined. While an accurate
census has never been taken, it is estimated
that Manchuria has a population of about
25,000,000 Chinese and Manchus, together
with about 600,000 Koreans, 100,000 Russians, and 190,000 Japanese.
Although Manchuria is a part of China,
Japan and Russia have bitterly contended
over this territory and are vitally concerned
in its future. A correspondent has recently
stated, "Manchuria is the danger spot of
Eastern Asia and is also one of Eastern
Asia's greatest promises. It is a land which

three nations want and which three nations
are struggling either to possess or to control.
To China, Manchuria means a buffer state
against either Russia or Japan, a source of
income, a relief for over-population, and a
tremendous amount of what is so dear to
the Chinese--'face.' To Japan, Manchuria
means the promise of raw materials for
Japanese mills and factories and a market
for Japan-made goods, a source of income
in other ways and the front line of defense
against military aggression from the Asiatic
continent. To Russia, Manchuria is the link
connecting Moscow with Vladivostok, the
possible route to an ice-free port in the East,
a source of income and, at present, a chan•see Annex I for text of Tanaka Statement.
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nel for the propagation of Communist doctrine in China and Japan."*
RUSSIA AND JAPAN COMPETE
FOR CONTROL OF MANCHURIA

This struggle for control of Manchuria began in the final years of the nineteenth century. Resentment was aroused in Japan
when Russia, supported by France and Germany, forced the Japanese Government to
surrender the Liaotung Peninsula won from
China in 1895. It was heightened in 1897
and 1898 when the European powers freely
appropriated for themselves strategic points
in China. Particular apprehension was
created by Russia's apparent designs in Manchuria. In 1898 Russia forced China to
grant her a twenty-five year lease on the
harbors of Port Arthur and Dairen, in
which, according to the treaty of March 29,
Russia was given "the supreme civil administration."
Two years earlier the Russian Government had become actively interested in the
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway,
which offered the advantage of a direct
route across Manchuria from Chita, a point
on the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to Vladivostok at the eastern end of
the system. In 1896, the Chinese Government granted the Russo-Chinese Bank, which
had been chartered by the Russian Government the year before, a concession to build
the road across Chinese territory. A Russian company was formed actually to build
and operate the road. Under the terms of
the contract between the bank and the
Chinese Government the company was given
the right to acquire not only land necessary
for the construction of the line, but also
lands in the vicinity of the line for providing
sandstone, lime and other materials. Further provisions gave the company "the absolute and exclusive right of administration
of these lands" and the right to erect buildings of all sorts. Although China agreed to
be responsible for the protection of the railway and its employees, the company assumed
the right to employ its own police for the
maintenance of order within the railway
•F. H. Hedges, "l1a.nchurln. an Empire," T J'ans·Paciftc., Janu ary 16, 19 27.
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zone. The contract further provided that
after eighty years from its completion the
railway should revert to China without payment; after thirty-six years China would
have the option of buying the railroad upon
payment in full of capital, debts and interest.
As the line was completed in 1903, this option would fall due in 1939. *
Fearing that Russia was about to seize
political control not only of Manchuria but
also of the independent state of Korea, thus
threatening Japanese security, Japan embarked on the war of 1904-5 with Russia
which resulted in a Japanese victory. In the
Portsmouth Treaty, signed September 5,
1905, the Russian Government, with the consent of China, transferred to Japan (1) the
lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, and (2)
that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway
extending between Chang-chun and Port
Arthur, which is now called the South Manchuria Railway.
The treaty also recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea, which Japan finally annexed in 1910, and ceded to Japan the
southern part of the Russian island of Sakhalin, off the eastern coast of Siberia.
An additional article of the treaty provided that Russia and Japan had the right
to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards was not to exceed fifteen
per kilometer and was to be fixed by agreement between Russia and Japan.
On December 22, 1905, China and Japan
concluded a treaty in which China agreed
to the transfer of the above Russian interests to Japan. In an additional agreement,
Japan agreed to withdraw her guards along
the railway simultaneously with the withdrawal of Russian guards. While Chang
Tso-lin obliged the Russian guards to withdraw several years ago, the Japanese guards
remain to the present time. In an alleged
secret protocol to the 1905 treaty, China is
stated to have promised not to construct any
main line in the neighborhood and parallel
to the South Manchuria Railway or any
branch line which might be prejudicial to
the railway.
•see "Th e Ch in ese Eastern R a tl wny," In/ orma tion Bcrv-iccJ
Yol. II, No. 1. a n d Mac M ur r ay, mr reatiE'B a nd Agreementa
wit h n n d Con cer ning C'h in a," p. 1 222.
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Japan's position in South Manchuria today is based on the lease of Port Arthur and
Dairen, called the Kwantung Leased Area,
and control of the South Manchuria Railway.
In the agreements of May, 1915, following
the Twenty-One Demands, Japan secured an

extension of the lease of the Kwantung area
to 1997 and of her rights in the South Manchuria Railway to 2002, or a period of 99
years. This agreement also abrogated China's
right to recapture the South Manchuria
Railway in 1939, and granted Japanese
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the right to trade and lease land for commercial and agricultural purposes in South Manchuria-a right which foreigners generally
do not enjoy elsewhere in China. It was also
agreed that Japanese could prospect and
open mines in certain parts of South Manchuria, and that if foreign advisers on
political, financial, military, or police matters
were to be employed in South Manchuria,
Japanese should be employed first. If China
required foreign capital to build railways in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, she should negotiate with Japanese
capitalists first.
At the Washington Conference the Chinese
delegation asked that the treaties of May 25,
1915, be reconsidered and cancelled. The
Japanese delegation replied that "if it should
once be recognized that rights solemnly
granted by treaty may be revoked at any
time on the ground that they were conceded
against the spontaneous w:m of the grantor,
an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be
established, with far-reaching consequences
upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe and elsewhere." Nevertheless the Japanese delegation agreed to throw open to the joint activity
of the international financial consortium the
right of option granted exclusively in favor
of Japanese capital with regard to loans for
the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. It further stated that Japan had no intention of
insisting on her preferential rights in regard
to Japanese advisers in Manchuria. The
Japanese Government also withdrew the
right to negotiate in the future in regard to
Group V of the Twenty-One Demands.
Thus while the Japanese surrendered their
rights in Shantung, they now declined to
surrender their rights in the leased area or
over the railway in Manchuria. On March
10, 1923, the Chinese Government sent a note
to Japan stating that the treaties of 1915
were null and void, and that the expiration
of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen,
granted Russia in 1898 for 25 years, was
near at hand. The Japanese Government
declined to discuss the question and reasserted that the treaties remained in force.
The Chinese Government, despite the leasing
provisions in the 1915 treaty, has so far re-

fused to grant such leases to Japanese in the
interior of Manchuria on the ground that the
treaty is invalid.
By virtue of the rights which it inherited
from Russia, Japan exercises jurisdiction
over (1) 1,300 square miles in the leased
territory of the Kwantung peninsula, (2)
100 square miles in the South Manchuria
Railway Zone. The Leased Territory is
under the jurisdiction of a Japanese civil
governor, who also exercises a certain
authority over the Railway Zone. Within
the Railway Zone the company has charge
of a number of schools, laboratories, hospitals and agricultural experimental stations.
THE JAPAN ESE SOUTH
MANCHURIA RAILWAY

The most powerful enterprise in Manchuria is the South Manchuria Railway,
one-half of the stock of which is held by
the Japanese Government which guarantees
to this road an annual profit of 6 per cent
on the paid-up capital for a period of fifteen
years. Between 1907 and 1926 the annual
tonnage transported increased from 1,486,434 tons to 16,253,250 tons, while receipts
jumped from 9,768,887 yen to 106,491,136 yen. In 1924-1925 the railway showed
a profit of more than 34,000,000 yen, and it
has paid a dividend of 10 per cent for the
last four years. It has assisted the Chinese
Government, either through loans or by
actual construction, in the building of three
lines in Manchuria which act as feeders to
the main South Manchuria line. The rails
used in Manchuria construction are purchased from the United States Steel Corporation. It is an interesting fact that over a
third of China's railway mileage is found in
Manchuria. The South Manchuria Company
owns and operates 686 miles of railway in
South Manchuria and it operates the 1,153
miles of State railways in Korea. It carries
on a large number of other activities, such
as the operation of harbors, coal mines, steel,
electric and gas works, and a chain of hotels.
In 1925-1926 it expended 4,419,000 yen on
hospitals and 2,445,580 yen on schools for
the inhabitants of the Railway Zone.
The South Manchuria Railway employs
nearly 10,000 officials and 29,000 employees,
or a total of nearly 39,000 of whom mor
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than 16,000 are Chinese. In addition, it employs 13,000 day laborers.
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
OF MANCHURIA

Largely as a result of the transportation
facilities afforded by the South Manchuria
Railway, South Manchuria exported 299,506,287 taels of products in 1926 and imported 248,134,219 taels, or a total trade of
547,640,506 taels.* Next to Shanghai, Dairen is the most important port in China.
The total trade of China in 1926 was nearly 1,988,000,000 taels. In other words, South
Manchuria, a territory having only 4.5 per
cent of the total population of China, has
over 27 per cent of the trade. In 1926 about
71 per cent of South Manchuria's trade was
with Japan.t
The trade of South Manchuria increased
from 395,263,204 taels in 1923 to 434,790,403
taels in 1924; in 1924 it decreased to 395,767,619 taels; but increased in 1925 and
again in 1926. In the latter year, it stood
at 547,640,506. The principal export of
Manchuria is the soy bean which is used in
a soup eaten by the majority of the Japanese
three times a day. A bean cake, made from
the soy bean, is used as a fertilizer for the
rice fields of Japan. This product, coming
chiefly from Manchuria, is regarded along
with rice as a fundamental food in the diet
of the Japanese people.
Within the Kwantung Leased Area and the
South Manchuria Railway Zone the Japanese
have maintained an orderly and efficient administration. Partly as the result of their
efforts, the population of Dairen has increased from 18,000 in 1906 to 201,774 in
1926 of whom 123,146 are Chinese. It is
estimated that while the Chinese population
, in Manchuria has about doubled during the
past twenty years, it has increased more
than fourteen fold within the Railway Zone.
Apparently the Chinese have taken up their
residence in this Japanese zone because of
the fact that, compared with other parts of
China, more security prevails and greater
opportunities for employment exist.
'Trade Return oJ Nortl• China, 1926, Vol. I. Ma.nchtlrla.,
Research Office, Department of Welfare, Research a.nd Foreign
omces, S. M. R. Co., June, 1927. p. 3. The export figure Indud~• re-exports.
A tael ts worth about 76 centa (American).
tThe coast trade Is not Included In the toto.! trade but the
trade of Korea. Is Included with that ot Japan.
'

Industrial development in Manchuria has
partly depended upon labor from other parts
of China. It is estimated that about 30 per
cent of the labor employed in Manchuria is
"alien." Much of this has been seasonal in
nature, between 300,000 and 400,000 laborers coming to Manchuria from the overpopulated provinces of Shantung and Chihli
at the harvest season. A growing number
of these, however, are taking up their permanent residence in Manchuria partly because of disordered conditions at home.
Moreover, the number of immigrants has
rapidly increased-it has been predicted that
a million Chinese would enter Manchuria
in 1927.*
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN
THE FAR EAST

In the first few years following the establishment of the Soviet Government in Moscow, it seemed that Russia's power in the
Orient, including Manchuria, was on the
wane. Allied troops were landed in Siberia ;
a Far Eastern Republic was erected on
Siberian soil, and inter-allied control was
established for a time over the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1919-20 the Soviet Government informed China that it would surrender
all of the special rights which Russia had
enjoyed, in company with other powers,
under the "unequal treaty" regime. But
this spirit of renunciation was short-lived.
While Russia did agree to surrender her
former treaty rights in the treaty of May
31, 1924, she insisted on retaining a large
degree of control over the Chinese Eastern
Railway, which traverses northern Manchuria. Under the old regime, the road was
governed by a Board of Directors of nine
Russians and Chinese. But the 1924 treaty
provided that the road should have a Russian manager and a Board of Directors half
.
'
Russian and half Chinese. As a result of
this agreement Russia's control over this
important railway was partially restored.
As late as August, 1927, there were 15 000
Russians and 6,000 Chinese employed or: the
staff of the "C. E. R.".t
Likewise, Russia attempted to extend her
influence in Outer Mongolia-a territory ly•c. ·w. Young, "Chinese Labor Jl11gra.tlon to Manchuria,"
Chinese Bconmnic Jol'rnal., July, 1927.
tManchuna Dailv News, August

s,

1927.
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ing west of Manchuria and bordering on the
Siberian frontier, over which the Chinese
have claimed sovereignty for 200 years. In
1921, Soviet troops occupied Urga, a leading
city in Outer Mongolia, and organized a Mongolian government in virtual independence
of China proper. In the same year Russia
and Mongolia signed a secret treaty which
is supposed to have recognized Mongolia's
independence. In the 1921! treaty, surrendering her special rights in China, Russia recognized that Outer Mongolia "was an integral part of China." Despite this promise
the Outer Mongolia government is organized
on Soviet lines and is supported by Soviet
subsidies. The China Year Book, 1926, states
that Outer Mongolia is in fact no more than
one of the autonomous provinces of the
Soviet domain.
RUSSIA ENCOUNTERS
CHANG TSO-LIN

In her efforts to extend her influence in
Manchuria, Soviet Russia soon found a
worthy opponent in the person of Chang
Tso-lin, the war lord who has ruled Manchuria since 1918 and who today dominates
the Peking government. Chang steadfastly
refused to acknowledge the settlement of
Manchurian questions reached by the Peking and Moscow governments in the treaty
of May, 1924, and forced Russia to negotiate a separate agreement at Mukden
in September. Apparently Russia is the only
government which has signed a separate
treaty with the Manchurian war lord.
Despite this agreement, Chang has come into
frequent conflict with the Russians. He has
hampered their control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Chinese officials have taken
over the administration of the City of Harbin, formerly governed by Russian authorities. It is alleged that the Russians helped
to finance the Kuo Sung-lin revolt against
Chang in 1925. Their attitude toward
Chang was illustrated during this revolt by
the refusal of the Chinese Eastern Railway
to transport reinforcements without receiving cash payment in advance. After overcoming this obstacle by moving the troops
over a newly constructed "feeder" line to the
South Manchuria Railway, Chang retaliated
by ordering the arrest of the Russian man-

ager of the "C. E. R.". Following an ultimatum from the Russian Government, the
manager was released. The Russians were
also accused of backing Feng Yu-hsiang, the
"Christian" general, in the hope that he
would overthrow Chang Tso-lin. In this
struggle over the Chinese Eastern Railway,
Chang, it is agreed by most observers, is
proving to be the winner. Department after
department of the railway's activities has
been taken away from Russia and placed
under Chinese control, and even important
Russian officials, it is understood, have come
under Chang's influence. In August, 1927,
the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had
hitherto deposited its receipts with the Dalbank at Harbin, agreed to deposit half of
these receipts, which for 1926 amounted to
$8,000,000, with the Chinese bank. The Chinese have also appropriated for their own
use the fleet of river boats on the Sungari
which belonged to the railway. Chang's
attitude toward the Russians generally is
demonstrated by his periodic execution of
Communists and by his raid of the Soviet
Embassy in Peking in April, 1927.
RAILWAY RIVALRY BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Rivalry has also existed between the Russians and the Japanese, particularly in regard to the Chinese Eastern and the South
Manchuria railways. Both lines had been
built by the Russo-Asiatic Bank as a part
of a single transport system, and both lines
were broad gauge. Following the cession of
the South Manchuria line to Japan, the Japanese tore up the broad gauge track and
laid a standard gauge. The object in this
change was strategic; it was to prevent the
South Manchuria Railway from being of
military use to Russia in time of war against
Japan. But the effect of this change was
also to do away with the possibility of running through trains over both lines from
inland points in Siberia to Dairen and Port
Arthur. Despite this difference in gauge,
many shippers have found it profitable to
ship their goods from Harbin to Changchun
and then trans-ship them to South Manchuria Railway points. In fact, 60 per c~nt
of the traffic of the latter railway comes from
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alien lines; and 40 per cent of this amount
comes from the Chinese Eastern Railway.
When the Russians regained control of the
Chinese Eastern Railway in 1924, a traffic
war ensued between the two companies. But
so disastrous did it prove to the mutual interests of each, that a rate agreement was
made to the effect that 55 per cent of the
eastbound traffic of the Trans-Siberian Railway should be diverted to Harbin toward
the South Manchuria lines, while the remaining 45 per cent should continue over
the Chinese Eastern Railway to Vladivostok.
Despite this agreement considerable feeling has been kindled between Russia and
Japan by the construction of two branch
lines in Manchuria which may vitally affect
the Chinese Eastern from the economic and
strategic standpoint. The first of these
branches connects the city of Taonan with
Tsitsihar, a town lying eighteen miles north
of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nominally
the Taonan line is Chinese, but it has been
constructed by the South Manchuria company at a cost of 12,000,000 yen. For a time
the progress of the road was blocked by the
protest of the Soviet Government that it invaded Northern Manchuria, a sphere in
which it claimed Russia had a preferential
position. In reply, Japan stated that Russia
had surrendered all special privileges in
China and that Japan was entitled to build
the road under the Open Door principle.
The Tsitsihar extension is of strategic importance inasmuch as it may enable the
Japanese to cut off Russian access to the sea
in time of war. It also drains the valuable
produce center of Anta.
In October, 1925, the South Manchuria
Railway signed an agreement with the Chinese Government providing for the construction of a second extension, from Kirin to
Tonghua, a distance of 60 miles. The J apanese Government apparently favors the extension of this line to Kainei, a town near
the Korean border. Kainei is already linked
by rail to the Korean seaport of Seishin.
When this Kirin-Kainei link is completed,
the Japanese will have established complete
rail communication from Harbin to the sea,
which will be two days shorter to Japan
than by way of Dairen. It is understood,

however, that the South Manchuria Railway
is opposed to the completion of the road to
Kanei on the ground that it will divert traffic
from Dairen.
JAPANESE RELATIONS
WITH CHANG TSO-LIN

In so far as Chang Tso-lin has maintained
order throughout Manchuria and has opposed the Russian advance, he has won the
sympathy of Japan. But when he has been
unable to maintain order in areas where
Japanese interests are important, the Japanese Government has not hesitated to intervene. In December, 1925, General Kuo Sunglin staged a revolt in which he almost routed
Chang who was obliged to retire within the
walled city of Mukden. After some discussion during which the Military Staff urged
action, the Japanese cabinet suddenly decided to rush troops from Korea to the Manchurian garrison, then depleted to half its
normal strength of 8,000 men. The Government also announced on December 16, 1925,
that it would not permit any fighting within
a neutral zone extending six miles on each
side of the railway. Morally strengthened
by the increase of Japanese troops and the
establishment of this neutral area, General
Chang rallied his forces and defeated Kuo,
who when captured was decapitated. Following this defeat, the Japanese Foreign
Office issued a statement that "there is every
reason to believe that conditions will soon
be normal" and that there is "no further
necessity for Japan's holding a six-mile zone
of neutrality along the South Manchuria
Railway, since there is no longer any opposition to Chang's authority and power to be
expected."
Sometime after his victory over Kuo,
Chang is reported to have publicly thanked
the Japanese for their assistance. A Japanese writer, Dr. Washio, also wrote:
"Whenever Japan sends troops to China
they operate, deliberately or not, in favor
of Chang Tso-lin, and Chinese civil war
being more of a political campaign than a
military engagement, the prestige of J apanese troops exerts an influence out of proportion to the number of troops that are
actually sent.... At the time of Kuo Sunglin's revolt the presence of a couple of
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thousand of Japanese soldiers made it possible, accidentally or not, to save the day
for Chang Tso-lin ... The idea that Manchuria has been solidly under Chang's
domination is a fiction. Without the prestige of the Japanese cooperation he would
have been ousted long ago by internal
rivals."*
On the other hand, Baron Shidehara,
then Japanese Foreign Minister, denied
the statement that the Japanese had favored Chang. In an address to the Diet
in January, 1926, he stated that: "We deplore these unfounded, undeserved accusations, and in denying them categorically,
we are confident that history will be the
final judge of our clear conscience . . . It
is a well known fact that Japan possesses
essential rights and interests, both corporeal and incorporeal, in the region of
Manchuria and Mongolia. Of such rights
and interests, those that have taken a tangible shape, and are liable to destruction by
acts of wa1·, are now mainly to be found
along the line of the South Manchuria Railway. In order to protect them from destruction we have been constrained to make
necessary provision, which, we believe, has
duly accomplished its end. With regard
to our rights and interests of an immaterial
kind, they did not seem likely to be affected by the war, and we are satisfied
that they have in fact remained entirely
unaffected.
"No doubt, the complete tranquillity of
the whole region of the Three Provinces,
undisturbed by any scourge of war, is
highly to be desired, in the interest of the
native population as well as Japanese residents. It is, however, a responsibility that
properly rests upon China. Assumption
of that responsibility by Japan without just
cause would be manifestly inconsistent
with the fundamental conception of existing international relations, with the basic
principles of the Washington treaties, and
with repeated declarations of the Japanese
Government."t
This cautious statement did not, however, appeal to the Japanese residents in
•"The

Far

Eastern

Conference,'"

Trans-Paeiftc_.

July

9,

Manchuria, dissatisfied with the existing
economic conditions. The average annual
rate of increase in the number of Japanese
in Manchuria for the last three years has
been only 3.2 per cent; and out of 125
Japanese firms publishing accounts for the
first half of 1927, 53 showed a loss, while
only 37 declared a dividend.t
JAPANESE COMPLAINTS
AGAINST MILITARY RULE

Merchants complained that, despite some
increase in trade, profits were checked by
the dead-weight of Chang's military expenditure and by his progressive inflation
of the local currency-the fengpiao. These
conditions unsettled trade while Chang's
requisitions further reduced the purchasing power of the population. Many Japanese firms have not, moreover, recovered
from the financial slump experienced in
1920. Their latest grievance has arisen
out of the imposition of new taxes by
Chang. The first of these taxes, called
the shusho zei, was levied on Japanese
traders in the Railway Zone in which
Japanese jurisdiction prevails. This was a
tax on goods upon which the Japanese had
already paid a duty at the port of entry.
Hitherto the Chinese had issued certificates
for such goods, exempting them from further payment at "Open Ports" inland. The
Japanese claim that this is really a likin tax.
While the Japanese have recently succeeded
in getting some goods into Mukden without
paying this tax, the Chinese through fear of
punishment decline to buy any goods not
having a stamp tax. Following the example
of the Nanking government, Chang has also
started to collect the taxes envisaged by the
Washington Conference treaty, which were
not to go into effect until after an agreement
of the powers, which the Customs Conference in China failed to consummate.
In June, 1927, the Dail·en Chamber of
Commerce peti ~ioned the Tokyo government
to establish a colonial department, stating
that "Japan's colonial administration is at
low ebb," and that the policies of Japan in
Manchuria were "wanting in thoroughness

1927, p. 6.

tTran.s-Paciftc, January 30, 1926, p. 15.

tMancllurla Dail11 News, July 25, 1927.

237

JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA

and effectiveness." A mass meeting of Japanese merchants in Mukden also protested
against the "practical bankruptcy of the
Mukden government" (under Chang Tsolin), which had "bled the Chinese white and
paralyzed Sino-Japanese trade."
RESULTS OF ORIENTAL
CONFERENCE, JUNE, 1927

The Oriental Conference, convened by
Baron Tanaka, in June-July, 1927, carefully considered these complaints. In the
absence of Baron Tanaka at the session of
July 1, Mr. Mori, Parliamentary UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs, stated, according to the Osaka Asahi, "In a sense
Japan's economic development in that territory [Manchuria] is now at a standstill
and the main cause of this deplorable state
of things may be sought in the lack of a
fixed Manchuria and Mongolia policy. Inasmuch as an unsettled political situation
in Manchuria has been responsible in some
measure for Japan's failure to pursue a
settled policy unflinchingly in the past, it
is desirable that efforts should be made to
secure political stability in Manchuria. In
other words Manchuria must be made secure
from the political unrest which is almost
chronic in China ... " At the end of the
Conference, as already stated, Baron Tanaka declared that henceforth the Japanese Government would follow a policy in
Manchuria and Mongolia distinct from that
in China proper and that it would not permit revolution or disorder in the former
territory to disturb Japan's interests.
Evidence of this "positive policy" was
soon given in the removal of the presi'dent
of the South Manchuria Railway and the
appointment of Mr. Yamamoto, secretarygeneral of the Seiyukai party, who had been,
according to the Osaka Asahi, a confirmed
advocate of the "positive policy." Mr. Yamamoto is reported to have expressed dissatisfaction with the inclination of the Company
"to attach more more importance to business
profits than the Company's innate mission."*
After referring to Japanese sacrifices in
Manchuria, he is also quoted as saying,"The Railway Company has a more important mission than a merely economic one."
•TI•e M anchuria Daily Ncwa, July 20, 19 27.

Following these statements it was reported
that the government would confer certain
police and taxing powers upon the South
Manchuria Railway within the Railway
Zone and that it would increase the powers
of the president of the railway.
In order to attract Japanese enterprises
to Manchuria and to stabilize currency, the
government is considering the establishment
of a Central Bank, which would presumably
be a joint Sino-Japanese affair. It is also
considering the establishment of a Mongolia Development Company.
JAPAN ESE DEMANDS WITH
RESPECT TO MANCHURIA

After the conclusion of the Oriental
Conference, the Japanese Government decided upon four demands which Mr. Yoshida,
Consul-general at Mukden, conveyed to the
Civil Governor of Fengtien province upon his
return and which the Japanese Minister conveyed to the Government at Peking. These
covered the following points:
(1) That the Chinese Government
should grant land leases to Japanese as
provided in the treaty of 1915.
(2) That construction of the two Chiese railway lines, parallel to the South
Manchuria line (Japanese) should be
abandoned and that China should not
construct any parallel line in the future.
(3) That the Chinese authorities should
quickly agree to the extension of the Kirin-Hoinyung line.
(4) That Japan should be permitted to
open a new consulate immediately at Linkiang, a town near the Korean border
where many Korean malcontents reside.
One of the two Chinese railways mentioned in (2) above extends from Takushan
on the Peking-Mukden railway to Payintala,
paralleling the main South Manchurian
route. Another line, a hundred miles of
which is already constructed, parallels the
South Manchuria betweeP. Kirin and Hailungcheng. Invoking the alleged secret protocol
of 1905, the Japanese Government has repeatedly protested to the Chinese Government that the construction of these roads is
illegal. But the Chinese Government has
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nevertheless proceeded with the construction,
which is being carried on by Chinese funds
and Chinese engineers. Whether or not
these roads will be administered with enough
efficiency to compete with the South Manchuria Railway remains to be seen. The
Chinese motive in constructing these lines
seems to be partly economic and partly
political. Doubtless they believe that the
establishment of roads, entirely free from
Japanese control, would strengthen Chinese
authority over Manchuria. By means of
these roads, which will link the provincial
capitals of Mukden, Kirin and Tsitsihar,
Chang Tso-lin will be able to transport
troops without regard to the wishes of the
Russians or Japanese.
Railway building, it appears, has also
proved profitable to the Chinese generals. It
is stated that the officials buy up in advance
the land which the railway will traverse,
and then lay the road bed a mile or two
from the edge of the towns which it is
designed to serve. When the railway is constructed the intervening land, now held by
officials, greatly increases in value.
ANTI-JAPAN ESE
AGITATION

When news of the Oriental Conference
and of the rumored measures which the
Japanese cabinet had decided to take in
Manchuria reached China, feeling was
aroused. Resenting the protests against the
imposition of taxes and the construction of
the branch railways, Chinese mobs in Mukden staged anti-Japanese demonstrations in
August and September, 1927. The General
Guild of Mukden, an association of local
Chinese merchants somewhat similar to our
Chambers of Commerce, served notice on all
Chinese houses to buy no Japanese goods.
Some Japanese insisted that the riots and
other demonstrations were instigated by
Chinese authorities, that Chinese officials
took part in the anti-Japanese demonstration
meetings, and that Chinese policemen went
from door to door telling the people to display anti-Japanese banners and to march in
anti-Japanese processions. It seems that the
situation in Mukden is still serious and that
anti-Japanese feeling among the people who

have been affected by the nationalist doctrines from the south is growing.
It is understood that Chang is irritated because the Japanese Government, in compliance with an international understanding of
1919, has placed an embargo on the export
of arms.
Rumors have been frequent during the past
few months that the Japanese Government,
out of patience with Chang Tso-lin's duplicity, is attempting to bring about an understanding with the Nationalists in the south.
Dr. C. C. Wu, the Foreign Minister of the
Nanking government, expressing sympathy
with Japan's position, recently declared that
"the immediate return of the South Manchuria Railway and the Kwantung concession is impossible in reality and these questions must find their solution in the fixing
of a definite time for Japan to return them."
He added, "We understand Japan's situation: that she is in great need of raw materials and an outlet for her population, and
in this connection we intend to conform to
Japan's proposals." In some quarters this
statement has been interpreted to mean that
Nanking would bow to Japan's aspirations
in Manchuria in return for Japanese aid in
establishing Nationalist control throughout
the whole of China proper.
SINO-JAPAN ESE ACCORD
NOT IN SIGHT

So far there have been no indications of
an agreement between any Chinese faction
and Japan in regard to Manchuria. Japanese opinion seems to be unanimous that
Japan shall not surrender her railway and
leasehold interests and the Tanaka government seems pledged to a "positive policy"
which will increase Japanese control. Com- ·
menting on the Tanaka policy, the Osaka
Asahi says, "As the general outlines of the
new Manchuria and Mongolia policy clearly
show, the present Cabinet is more positive
about Japan's special position in Manchuria
and Mongolia than any other Ministry in the
past. It is doubtful whether the Okuma
Cabinet had so confirmed a view about
Japan's position when it formulated the famous Twenty-One Demands of 1915." Whether
or not the Tanaka government intends to go
further than to insist on the rights granted
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in the agreements of May, 1915, (the validity
of \vhich the Chinese refuse to recognize) remains to be seen. Nevertheless the mere
announcement of the "positive policy" already seems to have stimulated anti-Japanese feeling throughout Manchuria. Hitherto
the Japanese have taken the position that
in view of the lower standard of living of
the Chinese and the unwillingness of the
Japanese to live in Manchuria, on account
of its climate, the territory can be developed
only by Chinese, working in cooperation with
the Japanese. The Japanese Government
must decide whether or not this principle,

the application of which depends upon
Chinese goodwill, can be reconciled with the
"positive policy." It must decide whether,
especially in view of the critical financial and
economic situation of Japan which has re~
suited from the recent earthquake and financial crisis, it will be able to impose a "positive
policy" upon Manchuria, which is a portion
of China, a country in which nationalist
sentiment has recently become strong. While
no one may predict the future, it seems that
the question whether Manchuria will become
independent of China will be a critical one
during the next ten years.

STATEMENT OF PREMIER TAN AKA AT THE ORIENTAL
CONFERENCE, JULY 7, 1927
The maintenance of peace in the Far East and
the realization of the common prosperity of Japan
and China form the basic principle of Japanese
policy towards China. The methods of carrying
out the principle, however, may vary in its application to China proper and to Manchuria and Mongolia, in view of our special position in the Far East.
The general outline of our policy towards China,
which is based on this fundamental principle, may
be summed up as follows:
1. Although the stabilization of the political
situation and the restoration of peace and order in
China constitute the crying need of the times, yet
the best way to realize them is to let the Chinese
people themselves undertake it. Therefore, in the
present internal political conflict in that country,
we should not take the side of any party or clique
and should respect the popular will and strictly
avoid such steps as might interfere with the contending forces.
2. We are heartily in sympathy with the legitimate national aspirations that emanate from the
moderate elements in China, and we should always
be ready to cooperate with them for their rational
and gradual attainment through cooperation with
the Powers as far as possible.
At the same time, the peaceful economic development of China is a matter ardently desired equally
by the Chinese and the foreign peoples and its accomplishment demands the friendly cooperation of
the Powers as well as the endeavors of the Chinese
people themselves.
3. The aforementioned objects can be accomplished only when a stable central government is
established, but, when we view the present political
situation in China, we find that the establishment
of such a government is no easy matter. In the
existing circumstances, therefore, we have no alternative but to keep ourselves properly in touch with
moderate political factors in various places for the

time being and to await the development of events
for the gradual unification of the country.
4. If, with the transition of the political situation, the governments of the North and South are
combined or a federation of local political groups
is formed, it is a matter of course that the attitude
of the Japanese Government towards such different
political factors will be entirely unchanged. If,
under such conditions, a tendency at·ises toward the
establishment of a unified government to deal with
the foreign relations of China, we shall welcome it,
as also will the Powers and stand ready to assist
in the growth of such a government.
5. It is irrefutable that the radical and destructive elements, taking advantage of the political unrest in China, may become rampant and disturb the
public peace, thereby causing unfortunate international embroglios. The Japanese Government expects that the suppression of obnoxious elements
and the maintenance of peace and order will be
effected through the control of the Chinese authorities and the efforts of the Chinese people themselves; but, in the case of infringement of our
legitimate rights and interests and the lives and
property of our nationals, there will be no alternative for us but resolutely to take self-defensive
measures and protect them, if necessary. Particularly, it is necessary to dispel the misapprehensions
and misunderstandings of those who, on the strength
of unfounded rumors concerning Sino-Japanese relations, blindly start a movement to boycott Japanese
goods and, to take appropriate measures for safeguarding our rights.
6. Since Manchuria and Mongolia, particularly
The Three Eastern Provinces, have an important
bearing upon the national defence and existence of
this country, we must devote especial attention to
those regions. We feel, moreover, particular responsibility as a neighbor for making them suitable
for the residence of both Japanese and foreigners
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by the preservation of peace and their economic
development.
The stimulus of the economic activities of Japanese and foreigners alike in both the southern and
northern parts of Manchuria and Mongolia, based
upon the principles of the Open Door and equal
opportunity, we hold to be instrumental in accelerating the peaceful development of those regions and
we should act in accordance with this principle in
safeguarding our already acquired rights and interests and in solving pending questions.

7. I believe that it will be best to leave stabilization of the political situation in the Three Eastern

Provinces in their own hands. Any plan which
will respect our special position in Manchuria and
Mongolia and devise measures for stabilizing the
political situation there will receive the due assistance of the Japanese Government.
8. If the disturbances spread to Manchuria and
Mongolia, and as a result, peace and order are disrupted, thereby menacing our special position and
rights and interests in those regions, we must be
determined to defend them, no matter whence the
menace comes, and take proper steps without loss
of time in order to preserve the regions as lands
for peaceful habitation and development equally to
Japanese and foreigners.
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